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Abstract—The multi-UAV network is promising to extend
conventional networks by providing broader coverage and better
reliability. Nevertheless, the broadcast nature of wireless signals
and the broader coverage expose multi-UAV communications to
the threats of passive eavesdroppers. Recent studies mainly focus
on securing a single legitimate link, or communications between a
UAV and multiple ground users in one/two-UAV-aided networks,
while the physical layer secrecy analysis for hierarchical multi-
UAV networks is underexplored. In this paper, we investigate
a general two-tier UAV network consisting of multiple UAV
transmitters (UTs) and multiple UAV receivers (URs) in the
presence of multiple UAV eavesdroppers (UEs). To protect all
legitimate UT-UR links against UEs at the physical layer, we
design a two-stage framework consisting of a UT-UR association
stage and a cooperative transmission stage. Specifically, we
formulate the secure transmission problem into a many-to-one
matching game followed by an overlapping coalition formation
(OCF) game, taking into account the limited capabilities and
the throughput requirements of URs, as well as the transmission
power constraints of UTs. A matching algorithm and an OCF
algorithm are proposed to solve these two sequential games
whose convergences and stabilities are guaranteed theoretically.
Simulation results show the superiority of our algorithms and
the effectiveness of our two-stage game framework in the terms
of secrecy performance.
Index Terms—Multi-UAV network, physical layer security,
matching, overlapping coalition formation.
I. Introduction
Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have been rapidly de-
veloped over the last decades based on their widely known
advantages such as low cost and on-demand deployment.
Since a multi-UAV network can cooperatively complete the
mission more efficiently with larger coverage and resilience
to node failure, the use of multi-UAV networks to perform
various sensing tasks has recently drawn much attention, such
as precision agriculture, city traffic monitoring, and disaster
management [1]–[3]. In a multi-tier UAV architecture [4],
different types of UAVs that have unique features such as
maximum flight altitude, communication coverage, computing
ability and durability, can take different roles, which enables
more functional diversity for next-generation wireless commu-
nications.
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Although the broadcast nature of wireless signals and
the broad coverage provide efficient collaboration in a UAV
network, they also expose UAV-to-UAV communications to
malicious eavesdroppers, especially the more flexible UAV
eavesdroppers. A multi-UAV network usually collects vital or
confidential messages, such as the information for monitoring
an airport or a nuclear station, which may be intercepted
by criminals or terrorists to commit crimes. Therefore it is
increasingly urgent and necessary to ensure secure communi-
cations against eavesdroppers in multi-UAV networks.
In contrast to traditional cryptographic-based methods to
secure transmission, which are computationally costly and
unsuitable for resource-constrained UAVs, physical layer se-
curity (PLS) has been an effective alternative. Nevertheless,
although PLS in wireless communications has received much
attention, there have been few studies on protecting multi-UAV
communications against eavesdropping. Most existing PLS
schemes in UAV-aided networks focus on securing a single
legitimate source-destination communication link, leaving the
secure transmission issue in hierarchical multi-UAV commu-
nications underexplored. Specifically, they either protect a
single UAV-ground link from terrestrial eavesdropping [5], [6],
or secure a single traditional terrestrial link against ground
eavesdroppers [7] or UAV eavesdroppers [8], in which only
one UAV acts as a mobile BS/relay/jammer to improve PLS.
Furthermore, secure communications between a UAV-BS and
multiple ground users in the presence of ground eavesdroppers
have been studied in [9], where an additional UAV-jammer is
used to disturb the eavesdroppers, and PLS is improved by
jointly optimizing the trajectories and transmit power of UAV-
BS and UAV-jammer. However, these two UAVs are assumed
to fly at a fixed altitude, which simplifies the analysis but limits
the applicability in practice. In addition, it is difficult to apply
UAV trajectory and transmit power control method directly
into multi-UAV networks since then the collision avoidance
becomes non-negligible and more complex.
In this paper, we take the first step to investigate a two-tier
UAV network consisting of multiple UAV transmitters (UTs)
and multiple UAV receivers (URs), where each UT collects
sensing data from its coverage of interest and then delivers the
data to a UR for further processing. In this case, multiple UAV
eavesdroppers (UEs) intend to wiretap on the legitimate links.
Our goal is to secure all legitimate UT-UR links against UEs
in this network by jointly considering the UT-UR association
and the cooperative transmission scheduling. On one hand, by
properly associating UTs and URs, short-distance LoS links
for data transmission can be proactively established which
benefit both secrecy performance and the UR throughput
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2requirements. On the other hand, by performing cooperative
beamforming in which case a UT-source and some other
UT-relays transmit together towards the intended UR [10],
the achievable secrecy rate can be significantly improved.
Thereby we design a two-stage framework consisting of a
UT-UR association stage and a cooperative transmission stage.
To achieve this two-stage framework, we need to tackle the
following challenges.
In the first UT-UR association stage, the limited processing
capability of each UR should be considered, thus the num-
ber of UTs that a UR can serve is limited. Moreover, the
throughput requirements of URs should also be addressed in
the association process, which may conflict with the need for
high network secrecy performance. The second cooperative
transmission stage aims to find an effective relay selection
strategy for each UT under a transmission power constraint,
to maximize the total secrecy utility of the whole network.
However, such a UT-UR association problem and a relay
selection problem are non-trivial to solve because both of them
are NP-hard problems.
To tackle the above challenges, we formulate the UT-UR
association problem as a many-to-one matching game, in
which UTs and URs make their matching decisions based
on their individual preferences. Then, to model the complex
cooperative behaviors among the UTs in the cooperative
transmission stage, we formulate the relay selection problem
as an overlapping coalition formation (OCF) game, in which
a UT can join multiple coalitions to assist multiple UTs’
transmission in different time slots. In this way, by solving
these two sequential games, the network can achieve a sta-
ble association structure and a stable overlapping coalition
structure to perform secure cooperative transmission. In our
proposed multi-UAV network, UTs and URs are viewed as
selfish and rational agents aiming to improve their own utilities
through interaction and cooperation. This scenario fits the
future heterogeneous UAV network paradigm where different
companies with potential conflict interests launch their UAVs.
As game players, UTs and URs make their own decisions
in a distributed manner, which provides the network with
self-organizing capability and adaptability to diverse circum-
stances, thus benefiting the management and control of multi-
UAV networks.
A comprehensive survey of the application of game theory
to UAV networks is presented in [11]. Compared with cen-
tralized optimization methods that usually require frequent in-
formation exchange between UAVs and the central controller,
game-based methods enable individual UAVs to make their
own decisions, thus reducing the communication overhead.
Our main contributions can be summarized as follows.
• We design a two-stage framework to protect all legitimate
communication links against UAV eavesdroppers in a
hierarchical multi-UAV network from a physical layer
perspective.
• We formulate the UT-UR association problem into a
many-to-one matching game. Based on the characteristics
of our matching problem, we design a matching algorithm
to achieve a pairwise stable matching result with higher
social welfare of UTs and URs.
• We formulate the relay selection problem as an OCF
game. We also propose an OCF algorithm that maximizes
the collaboration between UTs and fully seeks the opti-
mal structure, to achieve a stable coalition structure for
performing cooperative transmission.
• Extensive simulations under various system parameters
prove the superiority of our algorithms, and the effective-
ness of our two-stage game framework in the terms of
secrecy performance.
II. Related Work
In this section, we show that our technical work differs from
some existing works related to matching theory and coalition
formation game theory in recent years, and we summarize the
differences as follows.
Matching Theory. Our matching algorithm differs from
the existing works. First, we have distinctly different flow
design. Quite a few works [12]–[14] on matching theory are
extensions of the classical deferred acceptance (DA) algorithm,
whose convergence and stability are easily guaranteed. In
comparison, our proposed algorithm consists of two phases,
i.e., a preliminary interaction and a swapping operation. Note
that the DA algorithm is used as a baseline for comparison
with our algorithm in our paper. Second, we have distinct
matching rules. The proposed algorithms in [15]–[18] differ
from the conventional DA algorithm. However, none of these
algorithms are applicable to our problem since our preference
functions have different characteristics. The matching rules
in [15]–[18] include that one cannot propose to the same object
twice and one can remove current matched objects. Different
from these rules, our matching rules are specifically designed
for our particular preference functions, aiming to yield higher
social welfare.
Coalition Formation Game Theory. Our coalition for-
mation algorithm differs from the existing works. Some
works [19], [20] focused on the non-overlapping coalition
formation game model, in which the players can only form
disjoint coalitions. In our paper, we model the relay selection
problem as an OCF game that allows a player to participate
in multiple coalitions to cooperate with more UTs, hence
improving the performance gain via a more complex coalition
structure. Apart from the differences in game formulation, our
algorithm design is also different. For example, the solution
in [19] is based on split-and-merge strategies, which are only
suitable for the disjoint coalition formation games. And the
algorithm in [20] is only based on a switching rule, which
greatly limits the search for the potential optimal coalition
structure. In comparison, our proposed algorithm can reach a
stable overlapping coalition formation. It is worth mentioning
that we have used the disjoint coalition game model and
the commonly-used merge-and-split strategies as one of our
baseline schemes for comparison.
Our algorithm design is also different from the related works
on OCF games [21], [22]. First, we have different initial states,
which are important for the evolution of coalition formation.
In [21], [22], the initial overlapping coalition structure (OCS)
is given as a set of singleton coalition. Unlike the simple
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Fig. 1. A two-tier UAV network consisting of multiple UTs and URs in the
presence of multiple UEs. The UTs and URs are deployed to execute various
sensing tasks, e.g. precision agriculture, city traffic monitoring.
singleton coalitions, we identify all potential partners of a UT
and put them into a coalition. Besides, we add a corrective
action to obtain a preliminary structure, which takes into
account the constraints of the limited communication range
and the necessary number of coalition members. In this way,
our initialization can maximize collaboration between players.
Second, we have different operation rules for each player to
update OCS. Specifically, in [21], only the joining operation
and the singleton coalition formation operation are allowed,
and in [22], only the switching operation and the singleton
coalition formation operation are allowed, which may hinder
the formation of desirable coalition structures in the iteration
process. In comparison with the limited operation, we provide
each player with more options to search for a better structure.
III. System Model
A. Scenario Description
We investigate a two-tier UAV network consisting of M
URs, N UTs, and S UEs in the air, which are defined as
M , {1, 2, ...,M}, N , {1, 2, ...,N} , and S , {1, 2, ..., S }
respectively. We denote by UTk the UT k, by URi the UR i,
and by UEs the UE s in this paper. As illustrate in Fig. 1, there
are N UTs collecting data from their areas of coverage, and M
URs flying at a higher altitude to receive and process data from
the UTs. A UR can serve multiple UTs while a UT can only
choose one UR as its receiver. We assume that this network
adopts a time division multiple access (TDMA) protocol which
is a typical transmission protocol, and our proposed algorithm
can be readily extended to the case of other protocols such
as frequency division multiple access (FDMA). Each UTk is
allocated with a fixed time slot TS k for its data transmission,
∀k = 1, 2, · · · ,N. Without loss of generality, we consider that
all UTs and URs operate over a common frequency band
W. Thus, when this network is well timed and synchronized,
the transmission is collision-free, since there is only one UT
transmitting data in each time slot and each UR will only
receive data from its matched UTs.
All the UTs, URs and UEs are assumed to work in a
half-duplex mode, be equipped with a single omni-directional
antenna. Let hki, hks represent the channel gain of UT-UR
link and UT-UE link respectively, where k ∈ {1, 2, ...,N},
i ∈ {1, 2, ...,M}, and s ∈ {1, 2, ..., S }. We also assume that the
global location information, including the UEs, is completely
known as the locations of eavesdroppers can be estimated via
an optical camera or synthetic aperture radar (SAR) equipped
on the UAV [6], [9]. UTs can further estimate the channel
gain based on the obtained location information since the LoS
channel gains only depend on the distance. Unlike the air-to-
ground propagation model which needs to calculate both LoS
and NLoS pathloss, UAV-to-UAV communications are indeed
air-to-air propagations, thus there is no need to consider NLoS
channel due to few obstacles in the air and the dominance of
LoS link [23]. For simplicity, we model the LoS channel as
hmn = d
−α/2
mn e jθ,mn ∈ {ki, ks},∀k, i, s, where dki and dks are
the distances from UTk to URi and UEs respectively. α is the
path loss exponent, and θ is a random phase distributed within
[0, 2pi).
Note that we focus on a static scenario where UAVs stay
static or quasi-static performing various sensing tasks. The
dramatical fluctuation of channels caused by the dynamic flight
states of the UAV [24], [25] is beyond the scope of our study.
The impact of mobility and flight states of the UAV on physical
layer security is an interesting research topic and it may be
our future work.
B. Cooperative Data Transmission
We consider a common cooperative relaying protocol re-
ferred to as decode-and-forward (DF). The complete data
transmission can be divided into two phases. In the first phase,
the UT source broadcasts its message to some UT relays,
which is referred to as the broadcast phase. In the second
phase, all the relays together with the UT source cooperatively
transmit a weighted version of the re-encoded message to the
intended UR receiver, which is referred to as the transmission
phase (note that the intended UR receiver refers to the desired
UR receiver of the UT source). For each UTk’s message
transmission, TS k is evenly divided into two sub-slots for the
broadcast phase and the transmission phase, respectively.
We consider there is an overall power budget P0 for each
UTk’s transmission, which constrains UTk and all its UT
relays. We denote Pb as the transmit power in the broadcast
phase, and Pt as the total transmit power of the source and
all the relays in the transmission phase. Obviously, we have
0 ≤ Pb, Pt ≤ P0. Suppose there are n − 1 relays assisting
UTk to transmit towards URi, the beamforming weights are
denoted by a n × 1 vector w (n − 1 relays plus the source).
In addition, the channel gain vector from the n UTs to URi
and UEs are denoted by hTRi =
[
hT1Ri , hT2Ri , · · · , hTnRi
]>,
hT Es =
[
hT1Es , hT2Es , · · · , hTnEs
]>, respectively, where (·)>
means transpose. We define a n×S channel matrix HT E , which
represents the channels between n UTs and S UEs. Thus, when
UTk together with its relays transmit a weighted version of its
message, the received signal at URi and UEs are given by
yRi =h
†
TRi
wxˆ + nRi (1)
yEs =h
†
T Es
wxˆ + nEs , (2)
where (·)† represents conjugate transpose, xˆ is the re-encoded
symbol which is normalized, i.e., E{|xˆ|2} = 1, and nRi and nEs
represent white complex Gaussian noise with zero-mean and
variance σ2 at the URi and UEs, respectively.
4Then in the presence of multiple UEs, the achievable secrecy
rate in the transmission phase can be expressed as
Ck =
[
log(1 + γRi ) −maxs∈S log(1 + γEs )
]+
=
log(1 +
∣∣∣w†hTRi ∣∣∣2
σ2i
) −max
s∈S
log(1 +
∣∣∣w†hT Es ∣∣∣2
σ2s
)

+
, (3)
where [a]+ represents max(a, 0), and γRi and γEs represent
the signal-to-noise-ratio (SNR) at URi and UEs, respectively.
For simplicity, we consider an extreme case in which we
completely null out signals at all UEs, i.e., w†HT E = 01×S ,
which is referred to as null-steering beamforming [10]. Then,
the second item in (3) is zero. We aim to maximize the
achievable secrecy rate with the constraints of transmit power
budget and nulling out signals at UEs. To get the optimal
weight vector, we formulate this problem as
w∗ = arg max
w
∣∣∣w†hTRi ∣∣∣2
s.t.
w†w ≤ P0w†HT E = 01×S . (4)
There is a closed-form solution for the above optimization
problem, which is given by [10]
w∗ =
√
P0∥∥∥(In − UT E) hTRi∥∥∥ (In − UT E) hTRi , (5)
where In is the n×n identity matrix, ‖a‖ is the 2-norm of vector
a, and UT E , HT E
(
H†T EHT E
)−1
H†T E . Note that in order to
successfully null the signal at all S UEs and obtain the optimal
weight vector, we need n > S here, which means that a UT
needs at least additional S UT relays to execute cooperative
beamforming together.
IV. A Many-to-one Matching Game for UT-UR Association
A. Many-to-one Matching Game Formulation
In the first stage, we need to optimally match multiple UTs
(no more than the UR’s quota, i.e., the maximum number of
UTs the UR can serve) with one UR considering their different
characteristics and requirements. Specifically, for each UT, we
view its secrecy rate performance as its benefit, and for each
UR, we regard its average throughput as its benefit. We aim
to maximize the social welfare of both URs and UTs in a
self-organized manner. Before showing the proposed matching
algorithm, we introduce several basic definitions [26].
Definition 1 In our scenario, a many-to-one matching is a
function Φ: M∪N →M∪N , such that
1) Φ (URi) ⊆ N , and |Φ(URi)| ≤ Qi,∀i ∈ M
2) Φ (UTk) ∈ M, and |Φ(UTk)| = 1,∀k ∈ N
3) Φ (URi) = UTk ⇔ Φ (UTk) = URi,∀i ∈ M,∀k ∈ N ,
where Qi represents the quota of URi. These three conditions
imply that each UR can be matched with multiple UTs while
each UT can match only one UR.
Definition 2 Given two disjoint and finite sets of players,
Θ = {θp}|Θ|p=1 and Ω = {ωq}|Ω|q=1, a preference relation  is a
complete and transitive binary relation between these two sets.
The expression ωq θp ωq′ imply that player θp prefer ωq over
ωq′ , similarly, θp ωq θp′ imply player ωq prefer θp to θp′ .
To quantify the degree of preference, we employ preference
functions. As mentioned before, each UT aims to secure the
communication between itself and a UR as much as possible,
thus it prefers the UR who could bring it better secrecy
performance. Hence, we design the preference of UTk over
URi as the secrecy rate under direct transmission
U ik =
log(1 + P0 |hki|2
σ2i
) −max
s∈S
log(1 +
P0 |hks|2
σ2s
)
+ , (6)
and if there is U ik > U
i
′
k , which is equal to URi UTk URi′ ,
then UTk prefers URi to URi′ in the matching process.
Next, we design the preference function of URi. We view
the average throughput of a UR as the average receiving rate
within the time for receiving data. The set of UTs matched
with URi is denoted by Ti. Then the preference of URi over
the set Ti is given as
UTii =
W
|Ti|
∑
j∈Ti
log(1 + γ ji), Ti ⊆ N , |Ti| ≤ Qi, (7)
where W is the shared bandwidth, γ ji represents the SNR of
UT j-URi link. This preference function implies that, during
the matching process, each UR prefers those UTs who could
bring higher SNR under the constraint of quota Qi.
To better define an important definition a stable matching,
we first explain the notion of a blocking individual and a
blocking pair. A blocking individual means that there exists a
player who prefers to be unmatched over matching the current
player under Φ, in which case we say this matching is blocked
by an individual. A blocking pair (θp, ωq) means that both
θp and ωq can get higher utility if they match with each
other, compared to their current match, in which case we say
this matching is blocked by a pair (θp, ωq). The conventional
stability of a matching can be defined as stable if it is not
blocked by any individual or pair.
B. Solution for the Matching Game
Based on the preferences design, we can see that each UT’s
preference is fixed and only dependent on the matched UR.
However, the profit a UR can obtain is dependent on the set
of matched UTs. The preferences of each UR is variable as
the matching structure changes in each iteration and accepting
more UTs does not necessarily bring greater benefits to a UR,
which makes the classical DA algorithm unsuitable and this
matching problem becomes challenging.
Obviously, for a rational UR in each iteration, it intends
to accept only the most preferred UT among the combined
pool of old partners and new applicants, rejecting all the rest.
However, this will lead to N − M UTs unmatched eventually,
which is not allowed in our work. To avoid this and achieve
higher social welfare, we set up a few constraints in the
matching process. The first one is that each UR can’t kick
out the existing matched partners. Second, a UT has a second
chance to propose to the UR who has rejected it before. Three,
5Algorithm 1 UT-UR Many-to-one Matching Algorithm.
Data: Qi, hki, hks, P0, W, σ
Result: Φ
1.Initialization: Tunmatch = N ; ei = Qi, ∀i ∈ M
Calculate preference lists: PT k = {U1k ,U2k , · · · ,UMk },∀k ∈ N ;
Calculate RP lists: PRi = {U˜1i , U˜2i , · · · , U˜Ni },∀i ∈ M;
2.Phase I: Obtain a preliminary matching Φ˜.
repeat
for all UTk ∈ Tunmatch do
propose to the current most preferred UR based on PT k .
end for
for ∀URi that receive proposal do
if ei = 0 then
reject all applicants.
else
divide the applicants into two categories: first-time applicants Ai,
and second-time (or more) applicants Bi. If |Bi | >= ei, URi accept
ei preferred applicants in Bi, and reject others. If |Bi | < ei, URi
accept all members in Bi and some applicants in Ai according to
Ai, which is determined by Algorithm 2, and reject others.
end if
end for
Update Φ, ei and Tunmatch
Record rejection: for each rejected UTk , record the number of times
URi rejects it and update PT k : U ik = U ik − δ.
until Tunmatch = ∅
3.Phase II: Swapping-matching operation. Φ← Φ˜
repeat
Search for approved swapping pairs:{UTs,UTt ,URh,URg}
swap them: Φ← Φts
until @ any approved swapping Φts
each UR should accept the UTs applying to it for the second
time or more as much as possible, of course, under a condition
of not exceeding its quota.
Before delving into our proposed algorithm, we first re-
define a new preference of URi over UTk as U˜ki = W log(1 +
γ ji), i ∈ N , which is only dependent on the specific UTk,
nothing to do with other UTs. We refer to it as the reference
preference (RP) of URi over UTk in the following. Moreover,
we refer to the open positions to accommodate new applicants
as seat, and denote the current capacity for new UTs of URi
by ei.
Our proposed matching algorithm is summarized in Algo-
rithm 1, which consists of a preliminary interaction and a
swapping operation. As for which UTs in Ai to accept when
there are available seats for Ai, we summarize the rules in
Algorithm 2 briefly.
When Phase I is over, we get a preliminary matching result
Φ˜. If there is a blocking pair, i.e., a UT and a UR prefer each
other to their current partner, then the UT is free to move
to the UR and the UR is free to kick out another UT (if
necessary) to make space for the UT. Considering that we
do not allow any UT or UR to go outside the system, nor
can any UT remain unmatched, we sort to a weaker notion
of stability, namely pairwise stability. First, we define a swap
matching, denoted by Φts = {Φ \ {(UTs,URh), (UTt,URg)}} ∪
{(UTs,URg), (UTt,URh)}, where Φ(UTs) = URh,Φ(UTt) =
URg, in which UTs and UTt switch places while other UTs
remain unchanged. Note that one of these two UTs involved
in this swap can be a “seat”. Then we give the definition of
pairwise stable as follows [27]
Definition 3 A matching Φ is pairwise stable (PS) if and
Algorithm 2 Selecting Algorithm (from List Ai)
Data: hki, Pk , W, σ, ei, Ai
Result: Ai
1.Initialization: Ai = ∅
Sort UTs in Ai in descending order according to the RP value in PRi:
Li = {1th.UT, 2th.UT, · · · , |Ai |th.UT };
2.Selection in order:
for nth.UT = UTk ∈ Li, n = 1 : min(ei, |Ai |) do
if U˜ki >= U
current
i then
Add UTk into Ai.
else
Break;
end if
end for
Ai is the list of applicants in Ai to be accepted.
only if there exists no pair of UTs (UTs,UTt), Φ(UTs) =
URh,Φ(UTt) = URg such that
1) ∀m ∈ {UTs,UTt,URh,URg},Um(Φts) ≥ Um(Φ) and
2) ∃m ∈ {UTs,UTt,URh,URg},Um(Φts) > Um(Φ).
In fact, a swap operation can only occur when all agents of
{UTs,UTt,URh,URg} “approve” it, i.e., the swap must strictly
increase at least one agent’s utility without decreasing the
benefits of all others. In Phase II, we repeat searching for
approved swapping pairs and swap the UTs involved until
there no longer exist such pairs.
The convergence of Phase I is ensured by our proposed three
constraints in the matching process, because that as long as the
total number of “seats”
∑M
i=1 Qi >= N, all UTs can get matched
with a UR finally even if the preliminary matching Φ˜ may
be unstable. And the convergence of Phase II is guaranteed
due to that the number of “approved” swaps is finite. Thus,
matching Φ will converge to a pairwise stable matching in
which no agent has the incentive to swap from its current
matching partner to another.
V. An Overlapping Coalition Formation Game for
Cooperative Transmission
A. Overlapping Coalition Formation Game Formulation
After the UT-UR association is completed, all UTs have
determined their intended data receivers. In the second stage,
each UT needs to carefully select its relay UT according to the
potential benefits and the required costs. UTk and all its relay
UTs will form a group to perform cooperative beamforming
towards the intended UR in the time slot TS k. Due to that
each UT can act as the relay of multiple UTs in different
time slots, and there is not any utility transfer between UTs,
we use a nontransferable utility (NTU) OCF game to figure
out an effective overlapping coalition structure, in which each
UT can participate in multiple coalitions to achieve higher
utility. To better understand the proposed OCF algorithm, we
introduce some related definitions in OCF game [28].
Definition 4 A NTU overlapping coalition formation game is
defined as G = (N , v), where N is the set of players in this
game, and v is the utility function. Note that v(∅) = 0.
Definition 5 An overlapping coalition structure Π over (N , v)
is defined as a set list: Π = {C1,C2, · · · ,Cu}, where u is the
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Fig. 2. Illustration of an overlapping coalition structure.
number of coalitions, ∀1 ≤ x ≤ u,Cx ⊆ N , ∪ux=1Cx = N , and
as the coalitions can be overlapped, ∃x , x′ ,Cx ⋂Cx′ , ∅.
Corresponding to our investigated scenario, the OCF game
players are N UTs. For each UTk, it may have some allies who
can act as its relays during time slot TS k, and we denote the
group of all its allies plus itself by a set Fk. In time slot TS k,
all members in Fk will perform the cooperative beamforming
together. Given an overlapping coalition structure, each UT
can assist the data transmission of some specific UTs in the
corresponding time slots. For example, as illustrated in Fig. 2,
there are seven UT players and they form a four-coalition
overlapping coalition structure. UT1 and UT2 have a same
group, i.e., F1 = F2 = C1 = {UT1,UT2,UT3,UT4}. UT3
and UT4 have a same group, i.e., F3 = F4 = C1 ∪ C2 =
{UT1,UT2,UT3,UT4,UT6}, and similarly, there are F5 =
C3 = {UT5}, F6 = C2 = {UT3,UT4,UT6}, F7 = C4 = {UT7}.
Next, we analyze the payoff and costs of UTs during
the cooperative beamforming transmission. For UTk matched
with URi, in its broadcast phase, there exist a secrecy rate
loss due to the fact that UEs may overhear the information
transmission. We define the cost function as the maximum
loss value among all UEs, i.e.,
ck =
1
2
max
s∈S
log(1 +
Pb|hks|2
σ2s
), (8)
where 1/2 represents that this phase occupies half of the time
slot. Then in the transmission phase, when UTk and its allies
send a weighted version of the message with the optimal
weight vector w∗, the achievable secrecy rate Ck, i.e., the
payoff of UTk, is given by
Ck =
1
2
log(α +
| (w∗)† hTRi |2
σ2i
), (9)
where α = 1+Pb|hki|2/σ2i . Note that Pb|hki|2/σ2i is the received
SNR at the destination URi in the broadcast phase.
Furthermore, we suppose there exists a minimum SNR
threshold above which the relays can effectively decode sig-
nals, denoted by γˆ. Thus, given a coalition structure, in order
that all the members of Fk can successfully decode the signal
of UTk and the secrecy loss in this phase can be minimized, the
broadcast power Pb should be Pb = γˆ σ2/|hkk˜ |2, where hkk˜ is
the channel gain between UTk and UTk˜ who is the furthest ally
of UTk in set Fk. If the required Pb exceeds the transmit power
Algorithm 3 The Overlapping Coalition Formation Algorithm
Initialization: Π = {C1,C2, · · · ,CN },Cm = ∅, for m = 1 : N.
1. For k = 1 : N, identify all potential partners of UTk and put them into
coalition Ck .
2. Correct the coalitions:
If ∃k, |Ck | < S + 1, then Ck = {UTk}, and kick out UTk from Cp(if UTk
exists in Cp), ∀p , k, p ∈ N
If ∃m, n,Cm = Cn,m < n, remove Cn from structure Π.
A preliminary structure Π = {C1,C2, · · · ,Cu} is obtained, where u is the
number of coalitions after correcting.
repeat
for UTk , k = 1 : N do
it randomly select Ca ∈ {C j |k ∈ C j,C j ∈ Π} and Cb ∈ {C j |k < C j,C j ∈
Π} ∪ ∅.
ΠQuit , {Π \Ca} ∪ {Ca \ {i}}
if vk(ΠQuit) ≥ vk(Π)and u(ΠQuit) ≥ u(Π) then
Πk = ΠQuit
else
ΠJoin , {Π \Cb} ∪ {Cb ∪ {i}}
if vk(ΠJoin) > vk(Π)and u(ΠJoin) ≥ u(Π) then
Πk = ΠJoin
else
ΠS witch , {Π \ {Ca,Cb}} ∪ {Cb ∪ {i}} ∪ {Ca \ {i}}
if vk(ΠS witch) > vk(Π)and u(ΠS witch) ≥ u(Π) then
Πk = ΠS witch
else
Πk = Π
end if
end if
end if
end for
Select a structure with the highest total utility from a set Ω ,
{Π1,Π2, · · · ,ΠN } and set it as the new structure:
Π = arg maxΠk∈Ω{u(Πk)}
until ∀k ∈ N ,Πk = Π
budget P0, this Fk can not perform cooperative beamforming
successfully and we define the utility in such case as minus
infinity. Moreover, in another case where 1 < |Fk | < S + 1,
the utility is also minus infinity since in this case no optimal
weight vector w∗ can be found in (4). Therefore, when a UT
is very far from all other UTs, or its neighbors are not enough
to form a coalition, it probably chooses to transmit alone, in
which case the utility expression is the same as the preference
function of UTk in the matching stage.
In a nutshell, given an overlapping coalition structure, we
define the utility function v of UTk as
vk =

[Ck − ck]+ , Pb ≤ P0, |Fk | ≥ (S + 1)
U ik, |Fk | = 1
−∞, otherwise.
(10)
In addition, we define the total utility u(Π) under an
overlapping coalition structure Π as the sum of all individual
utilities, i.e., u(Π) =
∑
k∈N vk.
B. Solution for the Overlapping Coalition Formation Game
To update the overlapping coalition structure, we define
three basic operations for a UT, which are Join, Quit, Switch.
Join is joining a coalition it doesn’t belong to. Quit is quitting
from a coalition it belongs to. Switch is switching from a
current coalition to another new one. Since a UT’s join or
leave may influence some related UTs’ utilities, we take
both individual and the total utility into account when we
conduct these operations in our algorithm. Before describing
7the proposed OCF algorithm, the concept of stability in an
OCF game is introduced.
Definition 6 An overlapping coalition structure is stable if for
∀k ∈ N , UTk can not make any feasible operations, including
Quit, Join or Switch move.
To achieve a stable overlapping coalition structure, we
proposed the OCF algorithm, which is summarized in Algo-
rithm 3. After a specially designed initialization, UTk makes a
decision whether to quit from a coalition, or join a coalition, or
switch from a coalition to another one, or make no change. The
structure with the highest total utility is set as the new coalition
structure. All UTs repeat this process until any UT would
stay in the current coalitions and make no change, because
making any move while others remain the same won’t bring
any benefits.
Next, we prove that the proposed algorithm can achieve a
stable overlapping coalition structure, after a finite number of
iterations.
Theorem 1 Our proposed OCF algorithm converges to a
stable overlapping coalition structure with probability 1.
Proof: (Convergence) Given the number of players is
finite, the total number of possible overlapping coalition
structures is finite. In Algorithm 3, we use a sequence
{Π(1) → Π(2) → Π(3) → · · · } describe the evolution of
coalition structure. Since each structure with the same high-
est total utility has an equal chance of being set as the
new coalition structure, the evolution process won’t keep
repeating the previous structure all the time. In addition,
every time a UT makes a move (Quit/Join/Switch), a new
coalition structure different from the last one will form. So
we can describe the evolution of coalition structure such as
{Πa → Πb → Πb → Πc → · · · }, where Πa , Πb,Πa ,
Πc,Πb , Πc. Then we explain why the case {Πa → Πb →
Πb → Πa → · · · }, in which a ”circle” appears, won’t
happen. Supposing a evolution process with a ”circle” just like
{Πa → Πb → Πb → Πa → · · · }, we denote the moves from
Πa to Πb and from Πb to Πa as Move1 and Move2, respec-
tively. Then all possible combinations of the (Move1,Move2)
are (Quit, Join), (Join,Quit), (S witch, S witch) (note that these
two moves must be of a same UT). If the moves is
(Quit, Join), according to the move rules, there must be
u(Πb) ≥ u(Πa), v(Πb) ≥ v(Πa); u(Πa) ≥ u(Πb), v(Πa) > v(Πb),
which is a contradiction obviously. Similar proof can be made
for another two combinations. Therefore, a “circle” won’t
appear in the evolution of coalition structure. In conclusion,
during the iteration process, the coalition structure may stay
unaltered but it won’t turn back among a finite structure set.
Therefore, our proposed algorithm will converge to a final
coalition structure.
(Stability) Once the algorithm converges to a final structure
Π f inal, it must be stable, because if Π f inal is unstable and UTk
intends to make a move, there is Πk , Π, which contradicts
the fact that the algorithm terminated.
2km
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Area for URs
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Fig. 3. Illustration for the distribu-
tion settings of UTs, URs and UEs.
Fig. 4. A snapshot of the final
structure with N=12 UTs, M=3
URs, R=2 UEs and Q=4.
TABLE I
Simulation parameters.
Parameter Symbol Value
Number of UTs N 12
Number of URs M 3
Number of UEs R 2
Quota of URs Q 4
System bandwidth W 100kHz
Noise power σ2 -60dBm
UT transmission power budget P0 10dBm
Path loss exponent α 2
SNR threshold γˆ 10dB
VI. Performance Evaluation
A. Simulation Setup
As illustrated in Fig. 3, the UTs are randomly distributed in
a rectangular area of 2km×2km×500m in the air, the URs are
randomly distributed in a higher area of 2km × 2km × 500m,
and the UEs are randomly located in the 2km × 2km × 1km
area which involves the areas of UTs and URs. The simulation
parameters are given in Table I unless otherwise specified. The
URs and UEs are assumed to have the same noise power, and
all URs are assumed to have the same quota. In order to obtain
more reliable simulation results, for a fixed number of UTs,
URs and UEs, we repeat generating random location layouts
by 100 times and average the simulation results.
Fig. 4 shows a snapshot of a pairwise-stable matching and
overlapping coalition structure resulting from our proposed al-
gorithms. The UTs, URs, and UEs are represented by crosses,
circles, and red squares respectively. We use the same color de-
note the matching relationship, i.e., the UTs are matched with
a UR with the same color. The gray dotted circles represent
the overlapping coalition structure that UTs eventually formed.
It shows that the UTs form a complex overlapping coalition
structure under this position layout. Some UTs such as UT2
and UT11 participate in multiple coalitions, which means they
own lots of allies when performing cooperative beamforming,
of course, they also need to assist their allies in turn during
these allies’ time slots. Therefore, it’s a mutually beneficial
way to work in coalitions. In addition, there may exist UTs
that prefer to work alone, just like UT6, this is because it is
too far away from other UTs to benefit from the cooperation.
B. Performance Analysis
To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed matching
algorithm and OCF algorithm, which are labeled as PMA
and OCFA respectively, we compare them with other practical
8schemes. First, we fix the matching scheme in stage 1 to be
PMA, and compare the OCFA with the other three practical
schemes under various system parameters in terms of the total
utility of all UTs, which represents the secrecy performance of
the whole network when transmitting data. Then, we focus on
validating the performance of PMA compared to other typical
matching schemes in terms of the social welfare of all UTs
and URs. In addition, we give some necessary analyses for all
simulation results.
Now we compare the proposed OCFA with the following
three transmission schemes, note that the same transmit power
budget P0 is applied to the individual or the whole coalition:
a) Alone Scheme (AS), where each UT transmits its data
by itself without any other cooperating relay in the cooperative
transmission stage, which is a non-cooperative approach.
b) Full Group Scheme (FGS), where each UT transmits
its data with all the UTs within its effective communication
circle being its relays in the cooperative transmission stage.
c) Disjoint Coalition Scheme (DCS), where the UTs form
disjoint coalitions in the cooperative transmission stage. We
employ the q-merge and 2-split scheme proposed in [29]. The
parameter q is the maximum number of coalitions that merge
into a larger coalition and is set from 2 to 6. We choose the
maximum performance value in this scheme for comparison
in our evaluation.
In Fig. 5, we plot the average utility per UT of four schemes
under varying N. When N is from 10 to 30, we can see the
average utility per UT of OCFA, FGS, and DCS increase as
N becomes larger, while that of AS is almost maintained at
a relatively low level. It is because that for the cooperative
schemes including OCFA, FGS, and DCS, there are more
potential allies within each UT’s communication range as the
number of UTs increases, which probably results in bigger
coalitions and more complex overlapping coalition structure.
However, for the AS, in which each UT transmits its data
alone during its whole time slot, the increase of neighbors of
a UT will not benefit it and may even bring in a competition
for the same desired UR in stage 1. Therefore, the cooperative
approaches including OCFA, FGS, and DCS are superior to
AS, which is a non-cooperative approach.
From Fig. 6, it is noticed that the total utilities of four
schemes have a very slight increase as the quota for each
UR increases. It is because that with more provided ”seat”
in stage 1, a UT has more chance to match the preferred
UR, who can establish better channel state with itself in
general, resulting in an improvement in the total utility when
performing cooperative beamforming in stage 2. However,
when a UR can serve more UTs, although there are more
“hole”, a UT can only switch to this “hole” when all involved
agents approve this operation, which limits big changes in the
matching results. Therefore, the impact of quota on the total
utility is very slight.
In Fig. 7, we vary the number of URs to be 2 to 7. As all
UTs need to match a UR finally, there must be a constraint
of M × Q >= N, thus we adapt Q correspondingly as the
number of URs changes (Q is set 6, 4, 3, 3, 3, 2 as the number
of URs to be 2 ∼ 7). From this figure, we can see OCFA
performs better than other schemes with varying M. When
the number of URs is 7, the total utility of OCFA is larger
than that of FGS, DCS and AS about 9%, 10% and 54%,
respectively. In addition, the total utilities of four schemes
increase as the number of URs increases. This is due to that
with more URs in the network, UTs are more likely to match
a UR with better channel conditions, thereby improving the
utility when performing cooperative beamforming. Besides,
the AS still gets the worst performance compared to the other
three cooperative approaches. In Fig. 8, we vary the number
of UEs from 1 to 6. We can observe that with more UEs
distributed in the network, the total utilities of four schemes
will decrease, which is in accordance with our forecasts. With
more UEs randomly distributed in this area, a UT is more
likely to be close to a UE, which leads to a higher secrecy
loss for this UT no matter it works alone or in a team, i.e., in
a cooperative or non-cooperative way.
We also investigate the impact of transmit power P0 vari-
ation on the total utilities of four schemes. From Fig. 9, we
can notice that the total utilities of OCFA, FGS and DCS
increase obviously as the transmit power increases, while the
AS curve grows very slightly. The reason is that with larger
transmit power, UTs work in a cooperative way have a wider
communication circle, which means they could own more
potential allies to combat against eavesdropping. Despite a part
of power loss and secrecy loss resulting from the information
broadcast phase, the gains from cooperation outweigh the
losses, which leads to an obvious improvement in the total
utility. For AS, the increase of transmit power would only
result in a slight improvement in the secrecy performance.
Furthermore, we can see that when the transmit power is
18dBm, the curves of OCFA and FGS begin to meet. In
essence, when the transmit power increases to 18dBm, the
effective communication circle radius becomes about 2.5km,
which implies a UT can cover nearly all others within its
communication range in this network, and all UTs probably
form a grand coalition to perform cooperative beamforming.
Therefore, when the transmit power is large enough, OCFA
and FGS obtain the same total utility in which cases a grand
coalition of all UTs will form.
In Fig. 10 and Fig. 11, we vary the SNR threshold and
the noise power to investigate their impacts on the total
utility, respectively. As shown in Fig. 10, the total utilities
of OCFA, FGS and DCS decrease as the SNR threshold
increases, while the total utility of AS has no change. It
is easy to understand that with a larger SNR threshold, a
UT can not form a coalition with the UTs far away from
it because they can not successfully decode and forward the
message when performing cooperative beamforming, which
leads to a smaller effective communication circle. As for AS,
the change of SNR threshold has no effect on it due to its
non-cooperative way. Fig. 11 indicates that the total utilities
of all four schemes decrease as the noise power increases.
With higher noise power and fixed SNR threshold, each UT’s
communication circle becomes smaller, which means each UT
will have fewer potential allies. Then we can notice that when
the noise power is about -70dBm or lower, OCFA and FGS
show the same performance, in which case a grand coalition
of all UTs forms to perform cooperative beamforming. As the
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noise power becomes higher, all UTs will make their rational
decisions to quit from the grand coalition and self-organized
into a new complex overlapping coalition structure based on
their utilities. When the noise power increases to about -
50dBm, as shown in this figure, the cooperative approaches
of OCFA, FGS and DCS become no different from AS, in
which case each UT forms a single-player coalition due to a
much higher broadcast communication cost.
Finally, in order to show the effectiveness of the proposed
matching algorithm in the UT-UR association stage, we com-
pare PMA with the classical DA matching algorithm [26],
labeled as DAMS. In addition, a random matching scheme
(RMS) is given as a benchmark.
Fig. 12 indicates that PMA outperforms DAMS slightly
in terms of the social welfare of UTs and URs in stage 1.
The underlying reason is that in PMA, a UR can choose
to reject some first-time applicants who cannot improve its
current benefit even if there are left ”seats” for them, while in
DAMS a UR accepts as many applicants as possible (up to the
quota). In our considered network, there may be cases where
a UE becomes very close to a UT, and for this UT, which UR
to match makes no difference to its benefit according to the
preference function, however, it makes a difference to URs.
The UT who does not care which UR to match may be more
preferred by another UR rather than the one it is applying
to. Thus in PMA, URs can own more options, and the social
welfare of UTs and URs can be improved to some extent.
In Fig. 13, we show the effectiveness of our proposed two-
stage framework. As shown in this figure, when neither stage
is applied, i.e., random UT-UR association and alone trans-
mission, the total utility is very low. Employing stage 1 can
provide a good matching structure for the subsequent transmis-
sion to achieve better total utility, and employing stage 2 can
further improve the total utility due to the effective overlapping
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Fig. 13. (a) Total utility when neither stage is employed (random UT-UR
association and alone transmission), (b) Total utility when only stage 1 is
employed (UT-UR association with the proposed matching game and alone
transmission), (c) Total utility when only stage 2 is employed (random UT-UR
association and cooperative beamforming with the OCF game) and (d) Total
utility when both stage 1 and stage 2 are employed (UT-UR association with
the matching game and cooperative beamforming with the OCF game).
coalition based cooperative beamforming. Furthermore, the
combination of these two stages can significantly improve
the total utility, thereby greatly enhancing the transmission
security in the network.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate the secure transmission problem
in a two-tier UAV network. To enhance the PLS of this net-
work, we utilize cooperative beamforming to combat against
10
the UEs and design a two-stage framework consisting of a
UT-UR association stage and a cooperative transmission stage.
We formulate the UT-UR association problem and the relay
selection problem into a many-to-one game and an OCF game,
respectively. Then a many-to-one matching algorithm and an
OCF algorithm are proposed to solve these two sequential
games. The stabilities of these two algorithms are theoretically
proved, and extensive simulations are shown to demonstrate
the superior performance of our proposed schemes and the
effectiveness of our proposed two-stage framework.
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